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Abstract
A lack of consideration of the founder of North Korea, Kim  Il- sung, and his fam-
ily’s perceptional variants has misled the estimation of North Korea’s provocative
policy. It is argued here that North Korea’s security dilemma and its obsession with
the various successions have been the principal causes of its provocative behavior.
When Kim  Il- sung and his family engage simultaneously in encounters related to the
security dilemma and major issues involving the succession, they provoke. When
their political survival is threatened, they take a step back. This implies that North
Korean policy should be directed toward factors regarding the political survival of
Kim  Il- sung and his family, not toward factors regarding North Korea as a state.
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Introduction
A lack of consideration of the founder of North Korea, Kim  Il- sung, and his fam-
ily’s perceptional variants has misled the estimation of North Korea’s provocative
policy and its determination to take risks. It is argued here that North Korea’s secu-
rity dilemma and its obsession with  father- to- son successions have been the princi-
pal causes of its provocative behavior. The security dilemma1has impelled North
Korea to generate, and thus portray to the world, provocative signals; and the  ever-
 pressing issue of Kim  Il- sung and his family’s succession has driven them to prior-
itize their political survival over that of the survival of the North Korean state. When
Kim  Il- sung and his family engage simultaneously in encounters related to the secu-
rity dilemma and major issues involving the succession, they provoke. When their
political survival is threatened, they take a step back.
Threat Perception and North Korea
When a leader perceives that his values and interests are endangered, and at the
same time he perceives an inability to control events and faces a lack of resources
that can be manipulated against this threat, we witness a leader who perceives threat.2
When a leader is uncertain about his international and domestic circumstances,
which would limit his choice between alternatives, perceptions matter.3 A leader’s
choices are not explicable without some reference to his priorities, obsessions, and
perceptions of international relations and domestic politics. His priorities, obses-
sions, and perceptions are signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by his assumptions, views, and pre-
existing beliefs.4 This is why each analysis encounters the issue of the objectivity of
the leaders’ perceptions and conceptualization.5 One of the most important reasons
for the North Korean nuclear stalemate was the perceptional gap between Washing-
ton and Pyongyang.6
A perception of threat would frame the situation in a way that would empha-
size possible gains or possible losses. To frame a threat is to highlight some aspects
of the threat and make them more salient in such a way as to suggest a particular
 problem- solving deﬁnition. Essentially, frames deﬁne the threat, identify the causes
of the threat, and recommend policy alternatives. In this process, threat percep-tion
frames the situation and choice of alternatives by drawing attention to speciﬁc ways
in which to respond and at the same time marginalizing more dovish perspectives.
In this respect, the leader would ultimately take greater risks than he had intended.7
How a situation is framed, intentionally or unintentionally, affects a leader’s
policy choices. The most fundamental effect of framing is to deﬁne the boundary of a
leader’s perception by placing a certain situation within a certain sphere of meaning.8
In doing so, frames inﬂuence the process in which the leader perceives, understands,
and remembers a certain incident, thereby affecting and guiding his subsequent judg-
ment and responses.9
A state’s foreign policy is made not just by  cost- beneﬁt calculations but by var-
ious domestic as well as international factors that frame  decision- makers.10 As defen-
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sive realists argue, the diagnosis of the adversary’s motivations in addition to its
capability is a critical element in assessing a country’s foreign policy. A different
interpretation of the adversary’s motivations leads to different policy prescriptions,
even under similar situations. Thus, interpreting North Korea’s motivations behind
its nuclear program should determine U.S. policy toward the Pyongyang regime.11
North Korea’s unconventional interpretation of threat is framed by the Juche
ideology and pursued in the name of military-ﬁrst politics. The theme of Juche may
be summarized as “deﬁance of fate and assertion as the actor, or subject, as the cre-
ator of history.”12 Rather than staying passive, the Juche ideology compels people to
struggle against a hostile environment in order to turn it into a favorable one:
The Juche ideology manifests a new question on the subject and the source of
power to govern and make changes in the world. The Juche ideology, by disclosing
a new view on the world that it is man that governs and changes nature and soci-
ety, does brilliantly answer the philosophical quest of our time in which people
emerge as the master of his [sic] own destiny and history.13
This explanation by Kim  Jong- il produced a useful inference. Kim  Jong- il per-
ceived threat and a lack of capability and resource to counter that threat, and as a
result he tried to reshape his environment through unpredictable tactics and rogu-
ish provocations. The point here is not whether his country is capable of changing
its environment at will. What is important is his belief that it is able to do so, or the
belief that “doing something is better than doing nothing.”14
What should be noted is that the founder of North Korea, Kim  Il- sung, and his
family prioritize their political survival over the survival of the North Korean state.
 Decision- makers interpret situations through their prism, which is molded by  self-
 oriented perception. They tend to assimilate new information into their preexisting
beliefs and values, which are the product of past experiences and educational back-
grounds. If they were to be faced with a crisis situation, they would be “predisposed”
to regard their opponent as about to attack.15 Thus, we may draw a similar conclu-
sion, that North Korea’s interpretation of the international and domestic environ-
ment is shaped by the founder of North Korea, Kim  Il- sung, and his family’s
perception, in particular, of threat. In this process, the legitimacy of Kim  Jong- un
equals the legitimacy of the whole North Korean system, nation, and state.16
Kim  Il- sung’s Threat Perception
It is not difﬁcult to ﬁnd a historical legacy of provocative policy that is rooted
back in Kim  Il- sung’s partisan experiences against Japan in the 1930s and 1940s.17
“Combat of velocity” is a common term for a campaign imposed by ofﬁcial author-
ities in order to accomplish the job within a short period of time. Ambushes and sud-
den strikes are typical tactics embedded in North Korea’s unexpected and abrupt
foreign policy. These guerrilla tactics were used by Kim  Il- sung when he confronted
a far stronger enemy force.
A further consideration that may have inﬂuenced Kim  Il- sung’s threat percep-
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tion and vulnerability may have been the Korean War. In return for taking the risk
of launching the war, Kim lost almost all of the North Korean territory by the end
of 1950. Had it not been for the intervention by the Chinese Volunteers crossing the
Yalu River, Kim’s North Korean government could have disappeared. These events
might have also inﬂuenced his policy toward China. Kim’s ﬂuency in Chinese, which
he gained during his schooldays in China, also played a role in strengthening
Sino–North Korean relations.
There was something more valuable, however, that Kim  Il- sung earned from tak-
ing risks. Kim could consolidate his political power because he could eliminate his
two rivals, Pak  Hon- yong and Mu Chong. Pak was the leader of the Korean Worker’s
Party (KWP) in the South when Kim  Il- sung entered North Korea as a Soviet ofﬁcer
after the liberation from Japan. Subsequently, Pak was charged as an American spy
and sentenced to death. Mu Chong was a  high- ranked cadre in the Chinese Com-
munist Party who had participated in the Long March in 1934. He was an artillery
ofﬁcer who possessed the rare capability of handling modern artillery weapons, a
capacity that Kim  Il- sung lacked. He was also a close friend of Peng Dehui, the gen-
eral commander of the Chinese Volunteers dispatched to the Korean War. Kim  Il-
 sung was able to purge Mu Chong when he failed to defend Pyongyang.
In the aftermath of the Korean War, the spillover of de–Stalinization from Mos-
cow resulted in Kim facing a political predicament. The anti–Kim faction inside the
KWP struck a political blow against Kim by criticizing the then embryonic stage of
Kim’s personal cult in 1956. After Kim expelled those who led the anti–Kim cam-
paign, China and Russia intervened in North Korea’s domestic politics and, as a
result, had to let Kim reverse his decision to expel the leaders of the anti–Kim fac-
tion. However, following this, Kim took action to oust most of the anti–Kim faction,
and as early as the late 1960s, only those loyal to Kim remained intact and on the
scene in North Korea’s domestic politics.18
In the late 1960s, just before Kim  Il- sung launched his succession plan for his
son, he initiated several campaigns purging cadres who were disloyal to him. At the
15th Plenum of the 4th Party Central Committee in May 1967, Park  Kum- ch’ol, a
member of the standing committee of the Politburo and the Party Secretariat, Ko
Hyok,  vice- premier of the cabinet, Kim  Do- man, party secretary, and Ho  Sok- son,
party chief in charge of science and education, were purged. Kremlinologists focus-
ing on North Korea indicated that they were in fact charged for their attempts to dis-
solve Kim  Il- sung’s personal cult. There was another purge in 1969 that was targeted
at  high- ranking military ﬁgures. Kim  Ch’ang- bong,  vice- premier and defense min-
ister, and Ho  Pong- hak, in charge of counterintelligence for South Korean affairs,
were ousted on the charge of mishandling cadre policy in the military.19
The sudden collapse of Mao Zedong’s heir, Lin Biao, in 1971 was also an inﬂuen-
tial factor. Lin’s death took place when Kim  Il- sung was approaching the age of sixty,
a symbolic age in Oriental society, implying entering into the twilight stage of life.
Lin’s death might have reminded Kim  Il- sung of the need to launch the only viable
succession option that could prevent de–Stalinization and insurgency from his des-
ignated heir;  father- to- son succession.
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In addition, the late 1960s witnessed the Vietnam War, which caused Kim  Il-
 sung’s threat perception. Vietnam and North Korea were the only two divided com-
munist nations in Asia. It does not take much effort to ﬁnd evidence in Kim  Il- sung’s
statements in those days that demonstrates that his threat perception was aroused
by the escalation of the Vietnam War. His statement at the conference with party dele -
gates in October 1966 demonstrated his perception that the war in Vietnam might trig -
ger a U.S. attack on North Korea, another divided communist regime in Asia.20 A
further statement he made in June 1967 hinted that North Korea’s provocative meas-
ures functioned as a warning directed at the United States and South Korea, which
implied that another Vietnam would not be tolerated on the Korean Peninsula.21
In the same vein, Ronald Reagan’s policy in the early 1980s to intensify trian-
gular security cooperation with South Korea and Japan also aroused North Korea’s
threat perception. The early 1980s witnessed the emergence of an increased U.S.–
Japan–South Korean security cooperation under the Reagan administration in Wash-
ington, the Nakasone cabinet in Tokyo, and the Chun Doo Hwan government in
Seoul. The coalition of these three conservative leaders was labeled as a trilateral mil-
itary alliance against North Korea.
Kim  Jong- il’s Threat Perception
While Kim  Il- sung’s pathway was aimed at consolidating his political power, Kim
 Jong- il’s footsteps to the throne were through the process of power struggle. Kim
 Jong- il’s political power, which proved to be stable enough to be sustained after his
father’s death, went through a process of consolidation as he struggled against his
stepmother, Kim  Sung- ae, and his uncle, Kim  Yong- ju.22 Kim  Song- ae is the mother
of Kim  Pyong- il, who currently holds the position of North Korea’s ambassador to
Poland. Kim  Jong- il’s power struggle with Kim  Song- ae may be traced back to the
early 1970s, when Kim  Jong- il took a ﬁrst ofﬁcial step as his father’s heir. In those
days, Kim  Song- ae was often compared with Jiang Qing because her practice of ofﬁ-
cial power went far beyond her ofﬁcial position, that of chairwoman of the Demo-
cratic Woman’s Coalition of North Korea. It has also been indicated that Kim  Il- sung’s
statement in one of his speeches legitimated her political power. According to a party
ofﬁcial who subsequently defected, Kim  Il- sung is said to have stated, “Kim  Sung-
 ae’s words should be regarded as mine.”23 Furthermore, she tried to erase the name
of Kim  Jong- il’s mother, Kim  Jong- suk, from the history books. Statements about
Kim  Jong- suk were deleted, and biography writers working on Kim  Jong- suk were
either relegated or expelled. At the same time, her brothers advanced into the cen-
tral scene of North Korean politics under the umbrella of their sister.
Kim  Jong- il—with support from the  ﬁrst- generation revolutionaries, including
Cho  Myong- rok and Ri  Ul- sol—was able to undermine her power at the party con-
gress in Pyongyang in June 1974, four months after Kim  Jong- il was appointed as a
member of the party Political Commission at the 8th Plenum of the 5th Party Cen-
tral Committee. This is probably the reason why Cho  Myong- rok remained remote
from the center of the North Korean power circle under Kim  Il- sung, who perhaps
10 NORTH KOREAN REVIEW, SPRING 2013
was not happy with Cho’s challenge against his wife. Immediately after Kim  Il- sung’s
death, Cho emerged into the center of the power circle.
The ﬁrst  father- to- son succession started when Kim  Jong- il was thirty and ended
when he was  ﬁfty- six years old. Over the course of  twenty- six years, the procedure
underwent four stages. Kim  Jong- il is known to have started working in the party
Central Committee as early as 1964; however, his rise in the North Korean political
scene started in 1972, when he was appointed as the director of the propaganda bureau
of the ruling Korean Worker’s Party.24 Two years later, he became a member of the
Political Commission (the Politburo). The second stage was the de facto ofﬁcial
announcement of Kim’s status as the heir. At the 6th Congress of the KWP in Octo-
ber 1980, Kim  Jong- il’s name was called fourth among the members of the party
Politburo, second among the members of the Party Secretariat, and third in the party
Military Commission:25 this implied his power ranking in each of the organizations.
The third stage started in the early 1990s, when he acquired control of the military.
In 1991, he assumed the post of Supreme Commander of the North Korean army, and
two years later he won the highly acclaimed nomination for the chairman of the
National Defense Commission during the 5th plenary session of the 9th Supreme Peo-
ple’s Assembly (SPA) in April 1993. During the three years following Kim  Il- sung’s
death in 1994, North Korea endured the absence of two key posts in its government:
the presidency and the general secretary of the party. In October 1997, Kim  Jong- il
was honorably appointed as the general secretary of the KWP. The succession was
completed through the amendment of North Korea’s constitution on September 5,
1998, which abolished the position of president (chusôk), the only position formerly
held by Kim  Il- sung that was still vacant at the time.26
Since he had assumed the NDC chairmanship, military-ﬁrst politics (son’gun
chongch’i) had been the primary means to maintain Kim  Jong- il’s power. According
to North Korea, the military-ﬁrst politics was intended to reﬂect the serious lesson
and the truth drawn from the history of the socialist movement in the twentieth cen-
tury that witnessed submissions in the face of military pressure posed by the impe-
rialists. The argument behind the military-ﬁrst politics was that the economy could
recover from a collapse; however, one collapse of the military would cause the whole
country to crumble.27 North Korea claimed that the military-ﬁrst politics of priori-
tizing the military over the economy accomplished many miracles, including the
launching of satellites, which were often known as  long- range missiles.28
Nonetheless, there is little doubt that North Korea’s military-ﬁrst politics was a
measure used to maintain Kim’s throne and his regime. When the CEOs of South
Korean media companies visited Pyongyang in 2000, Kim  Jong- il told them that his
power derived from military power. He indicated the solidiﬁcation of every North
Korean under one mind as another source of his power. He stressed that he required
military power in dealing with foreign countries, even with friendly relations.29
If the military gave him power, then in theory there would be something that
Kim would give to the military in return. This would possibly be more food distri-
bution, higher social status, and more privileges and prestige for the military. In June
2004, a North Korean representative at the  Six- Party Talks hinted that “a certain
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sector” wanted to produce nuclear weapons.30 On the day on which North Korea
conducted its nuclear test, in the  ﬁve- sentence- long memo that boastfully evaluated
the test as a historic event, Pyongyang made it clear that the aim of the test was to
satisfy the military.31A nuclear bomb might strengthen the prestige factor in the minds
of the military, which should be an important element in the nation’s military-ﬁrst
politics.32 North Korea’s deliberate and planned attack on the ROKS  Cheon- an in
March 2010 and the bombing of Yonpyong Island in November 2011 could also have
been measures to satisfy the military’s prestige. The recent promotion of Kim  Gyok-
 sik, who is known to have led those attacks, could signify that Kim  Jong- un is likely
to take a provocative stance toward South Korea.
In this sense, nuclear weapons, military-ﬁrst politics, and a nonaggression pact
with Washington were all policies that bolstered Kim  Jong- il’s political survival.
Other major interests, such as overcoming economic difﬁculty, including energy and
food shortages for North Korea’s state survival, were therefore on a list of secondary
issues. Stable political power was also a valuable asset for maintaining the founder
of North Korea, Kim  Il- sung, and his family. Any symptom or incident that was
likely to challenge or destabilize the political power of the founder of North Korea,
Kim  Il- sung, and his family is regarded as detrimental, and thus as constituting an
unfavorable environment.
Once the political survival of the founder of North Korea, Kim  Il- sung, and his
family was sustained and considered to be stable, the next priority was accorded to
maintaining the socialist system; it was through this system that the Kim regime
retained control over its people. Food distribution, the indoctrination of citizens in
order to preserve the Juche ideology, and the personal cult of the founder of North
Korea, Kim  Il- sung, and his family were all facilitated by the socialist system. North
Korea’s socialist system was incomplete without the Juche ideology, given that the sys-
tem was labeled as “the socialist system of our own.” In this sense, destabilization or
a total abandonment of the socialist system would imply that Kim  Il- sung’s Juche ide-
ology was misguided after all, a notion that was not acceptable. As a result, the pri-
oritization by Kim  Jong- il and his elites of their own security had created an
environment of increased insecurity for most North Koreans and for North Korea
as a state. Therefore, North Korea’s seemingly irrational responses to economic sanc-
tions should not be interpreted strictly within the realm of economic evaluation.33
North Korea’s Determination to Take Risks
As shown in the graph below, the founder of North Korea, Kim  Il- sung, and his
family adopted a provocative posture when it experienced a security dilemma and,
at the same time, underwent major stages of succession. The two overlapping peaks
of North Korea’s provocative activities also coincided with North Korea’s succession
agenda, notably the political purges in 1967 and 1969. The second overlapping peak
in the early 1980s also coincided with the de facto nomination of Kim  Jong- il as the
ofﬁcial heir. This correlation between the peak periods of provocative activities and
the domestic political agenda implies that North Korea utilized terrorism and vio-
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lations of the armistice treaty as a means of encouraging domestic cohesion, an essen-
tial element for consolidating Kim  Jong- il’s position as the top leader of the country.
North Korea’s provocative foreign policy  vis- à- vis the U.S. since the 1990s has
demonstrated several patterns. It deliberately escalated crisis as long as a war was not
plausible. It showed unusual belligerence when Kim  Jong- il was criticized. However,
North Korea’s verbal violence seldom accompanied actual military provocation
against the U.S.34 It stepped back and returned to the negotiation table when Wash-
ington’s military moves signaled that military sanctions were not ruled out. In doing
so, North Korea used Chinese mediation as a way out of U.S. coercion.
In the second nuclear crisis, North Korea reversed its confrontational stance
four times, in March 2003, June 2004, June 2005, and February 2007. Ironically, all
these reversals coincided with the U.S. dispatch of F-117 stealth bombers to South
Korea. On March 31, 2003, North Korea acquiesced to holding  three- party consul-
tations with Washington and Beijing for formulating the  Six- Party Talks after the
U.S. dispatched F-117 stealth bombers and F-15E  ﬁghter- bombers to South Korea on
March 19. Pyongyang’s return to the  Six- Party Talks on June 23, 2004, coincided
with the U.S. dispatch of fourteen F-117 stealth bombers in June. Again, North Korea
returned to the  Six- Party Talks in June 2005 only after ﬁfteen stealth bombers were
dispatched on June 7—and hence on three consecutive occasions since 2003. It was
also after the U.S. dispatch of F-117 stealth bombers that North Korea agreed to freeze
its nuclear reactor on February 13, 2007.
North Korea has taken risks when the political survival of the founder of North
Korea, Kim  Il- sung, and his family did not seem to be in danger, especially when
U.S. attention was divided due to the war in Iraq. Thus, whether or not North Korea
takes risks depends on whether U.S. policy toward Pyongyang constitutes a threat to
the political survival of the founder of North Korea, Kim  Il- sung, and his family,
rather than to North Korea’s survival as a state. With its attention divided due to
Iraq, Washington was unable to make the penalty credible enough to elicit Pyong -
yang’s cooperation. On the contrary, eliciting cooperative behavior from Pyongyang
was achieved through the demonstration of respect for Kim  Jong- il’s political status
as the leader of North Korea.
North Korea acquiesced to hold  three- party consultations with Washington and
Beijing for formulating the  Six- Party Talks on March 31, 2003, only after the U.S.
dispatched F-117 stealth bombers and F-15E  ﬁghter- bombers to South Korea on
March 19. The presence of F-117 bombers was very symbolic, because they are the
delivery system for  bunker- busting bombs. The stealth bombers visited South Korea
for the ﬁrst time in ten years since their participation in the 1993 Team Spirit joint
military exercise. One day after the 2003 Foal Eagle war exercise started, the U.S.
initiated the bombing of Baghdad. The stealth squadron and the F-15E bombers were
ordered to remain stationed in South Korea after the end of the Foal Eagle exercise.
The order was made public while, in Iraq, another squadron of stealth bombers
dropped  bunker- busters with the intention of killing Saddam Hussein.35
At the second round of the  Six- Party Talks (February 25–28, 2004), Washing-
ton and Pyongyang still drew a blank. North Korea proposed a formula for a “nuclear
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freeze for compensation” in accordance with its “action for action” code; however,
Washington insisted on a prior dismantlement of its nuclear program in a complete,
veriﬁable, and irreversible way. Kim  Gye- kwan, North Korea’s representative at the
talks, remarked that North Korea would not abandon its nuclear program unless the
U.S. ﬁrst abandoned its hostility toward Pyongyang.36 As the talks reached a stale-
mate, North Korea opted to leave the negotiating table. It was only the presence of
F-117 stealth bombers in South Korea in June that led to the return of North Korea
to the  Six- Party Talks.
Again, the U.S. sent F-117 stealth bombers to South Korea, on June 7, 2005. Fif-
teen days later, Kim  Jong- il disclosed to the visiting South Korean uniﬁcation min-
ister, Chung  Dong- young, North Korea’s intention to return to the  Six- Party Talks.37
North Korea’s return to the talks indicated that Pyongyang was following its own rule
of preserving the Kim regime at all costs, rather than complying with the U.S.-
imposed rule of nonproliferation. It is apparent that North Korea was always will-
ing to sacriﬁce nuclear talks as long as doing so would not trigger military sanctions
by the U.S. In contrast, Washington’s expression of respect for Kim  Jong- il’s dignity
would facilitate the negotiation process, because such expression might be perceived
to indicate U.S. intentions not to destroy the Kim regime.
North Korea’s missile and nuclear tests were conducted in the absence of the F-
117 stealth bombers in South Korea. On July 5, 2006, following a  six- month dead-
lock, North Korea ﬁred seven missiles. Despite repeated warnings, the test launch
did not trigger any military retaliation. One week before the test, President Bush,
during his news conference on June 29 with visiting Japanese prime minister Junichiro
Koizumi, had issued a stern warning that Pyongyang’s test launches would be unac-
ceptable.38 In the event of the test launches, Washington’s response was diplomatic;
it sent Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill to Seoul to prevent further test
launches and to try to draw Pyongyang back to the  Six- Party Talks. At the same time,
it also pushed for a United Nations (UN) Security Council resolution condemning
the test launches. On October 9, 2006, North Korea announced that it had success-
fully conducted an underground nuclear test. It described the test as “a historic event
that greatly encouraged and pleased the Korean People’s Army (KPA) and people,”
who had wished for a powerful  self- reliant defense capability.39
Twenty- two days after the test, North Korea formally announced its return to
the  Six- Party Talks, on October 31, 2006. Although the return was hailed as a diplo-
matic victory, it came only after North Korea had boastfully declared its status as a
nuclear weapons state. North Korea’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson boastfully
declared this status when he protested against UN Resolution 1718: “[I]t is quite non-
sensical to expect the DPRK to yield to the pressure and threat of someone at this
time when it has become a nuclear weapons state.”40 However, North Korea’s return
to the  Six- Party Talks was not realized until February 2007.
Nevertheless, there was no imminent step toward military sanctions; Washing-
ton took a step back by redrawing the red line. Before the test, the red line was meant
to prevent a nuclear test; now it was meant to prevent North Korea from transfer-
ring nuclear weapons or materials to state/nonstate terrorist actors. President Bush
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stated clearly that any state involved in nuclear transfer would be held accountable
and would face “a grave consequence.”41 There were other  high- priority issues in
Washington: Iraq, Afghanistan, and Iran, in addition to domestic issues such as tax
and economic reform, the midterm election, Supreme Court Justice nominations,
and sagging approval rates.42
Instead of the military sanctions that it had promised before North Korea’s mis-
sile and nuclear tests, Washington sent one squadron of F-117 bombers to South
Korea on January 11, 2007. Although the deployment was for the Reception Staging
Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI) joint exercise between Seoul and Wash-
ington, it functioned as military pressure in order to push North Korea into the  Six-
 Party Talks. Kim Gye Kwan, Pyongyang’s chief nuclear negotiator and vice–foreign
minister, reportedly called for insertion of a phrase into the ﬁnal text of the agree-
ment stipulating that South Korea and the U.S. withdraw the F-117 bombers and call
off the joint military exercise.43 Again, roughly one month after the F-117 deploy-
ment, the  Six- Party Talks triggered a denuclearization agreement, on February 13,
2007. In terms of this, North Korea agreed to shut down and seal its nuclear facili-
ties, including the reprocessing facility, for the purpose of eventual abandonment
and to invite IAEA inspectors. Only then would the U.S. start bilateral talks with
North Korea and thus work toward the establishment of full diplomatic relations. In
addition, Washington would discuss withdrawal of its designation of North Korea as
a state sponsor of terrorism and termination of the application of the Trading with
the Enemy Act to Pyongyang. Japan would also start bilateral talks aimed at normal-
ization with North Korea.44
Kim  Jong- un’s Threat Perception?
While Kim  Jong- un shares a common threat perception with his father, there is
a huge difference. The  thirty- year- old successor aims to maintain his political power
for more than forty years, roughly three times longer than his father’s reign. This
implies that he needs a different ruling mechanism other than military-ﬁrst politics,
a  short- term solution to overcome forms of social disruption such as serious food
shortages and the high incidence of criminal activity.45 The prioritization of politi-
cal survival would no longer work, because starved people would not survive for
forty years. The death of Kim  Jong- il in December 2011 raised various speculations
as to whether Kim  Jong- un would be able to maintain his status and how North
Korea would look with him as the leader. First of all, the two successions differed
signiﬁcantly in several aspects, as shown in Table 1.
First, Kim  Jong- un lacked time in which to consolidate his leadership before his
father died. When Kim  Il- sung died at the age of  eighty- two, Kim  Jong- il was a  ﬁfty-
 two- year- old leader, who had been the ofﬁcial heir for  twenty- two years. In fact,
Kim was  twenty- four years younger than his father when Kim  Jong- il died. Kim
 Jong- un lacked experience in the party—unlike his father, who started his career as
the bureau director in the KWP. In addition, he appeared to have jumped to the
 position of  vice- chairman without sufﬁcient experience in the military, although
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North Korea claimed that he had served three years of military duty in Chakang
province. It took eleven years for Kim  Jong- il to be promoted to the position of gen-
eral commander of the North Korean army, with the rank of marshal, since he was
ranked third in the Central Military Commission in 1980.
Secondly, the question of whether Kim  Jong- un could control the military requires
further observation. His  one- man entourage, Chang  Song- t’aek, lacked military legit-
imacy compared with that of Kim  Jong- il’s entourage, Cho  Myong- rok, Paik  Hak-
 rim and Ri  Ul- sol, the  ﬁrst- generation revolutionaries. These old generals, who fought
with Kim  Il- sung as his messenger soldiers and cared for young Kim  Jong- il before
the liberation from Japanese rule, exercised control over the military and set the
political environment for launching the military-ﬁrst politics after Kim  Il- sung died.
The current dismissal and frequent demotions of generals who hold key posts
suggest a power shift from the military to the party. It was at the party convention
on September 28, 2010, that the power shift to the party was signaled. At this con-
vention, Kim  Jong- un was named as the  vice- chairman of the party’s Central Mili-
tary Commission and was made a member of the party Central Committee. In
addition, the party was reinforced for the ﬁrst time since December 1993 by the ﬁlling
of vacant positions in the party Politburo, Secretariat, and Central Military Com-
mission.46 It was also the Politburo that adopted the resolution to install Kim  Jong-
 un in the position of supreme commander of the People’s Army on December 30,
2011. Again, it was the fourth party convention that had Kim  Jong- un installed to
the position of the ﬁrst secretary of the party in April 2012.
Most importantly, the Politburo decision to dismiss the general chief of staff of
the People’s Army, Ri  Yong- ho, on July 15, 2012, at the unscheduled meeting of all
members, including standing and candidate members, was a clear signal of the party’s
supremacy over the military. In addition, the demotion of  high- ranking generals fur-
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Table 1: Differences between the Two  Father- to- Son Successions 
FIRST SUCCESSION SECOND SUCCESSION
(KIM  IL- SUNG → KIM  JONG- IL) (KIM  JONG- IL → KIM  JONG- UN)
First major position Director, KWP Propaganda Unknown
Bureau
Positions and ages at  Fourth- ranked, Political  Four- star general 
the time of ofﬁcial Commission Vice- chairman, Central Military 
conﬁrmation Second- ranked, Party Commission 
Secretariat Twenty- eight years old
Thirty- eight years old
Entourage Cho  Myong- rok, Ri  Ul- sol, Chang  Song- t’aek
Paik  Hak- rim
Potential rival Kim  Pyong- il (stepbrother) Kim  Jong- nam (stepbrother)? 
Kim  Yong- ju (uncle) Kim  Pyong- il (uncle)?
Economy Moderate Failed
Source: Yongho Kim, North Korea’s Foreign Policy: Security Dilemma and Succession (Lanham, MD: Lexington
Books, 2011), p. 191.
ther implied the shift of power balance in favor of the party. Ri  Yong- ho’s successor,
Hyon  Young- ch’ol, was demoted from the rank of  vice- marshal to  four- star general
three months after his promotion in July 2012. Other generals, such as Choi  Pu- il
and Kim  Yong- ch’ol, were also demoted.
Thirdly, Kim  Jong- nam, the successor’s stepbrother, seems to have generated a
political burden as he has sought de facto political asylum in China. Frequent reports
on his remarks, and in some cases his opposition, to the succession are contrasted
with Kim  Pyong- il’s absolute silence. How Kim  Jong- un will manage his brother
requires further observation; however, the successor will surely regard his brother’s
stay in China as a destabilizing factor.
In this regard, Kim  Jong- un’s threat perception seems to be caused more by his
concern over his political survival than by the security dilemma. Ironically, the more
Kim  Jong- un becomes obsessed with his political survival, without improving the
standard of living of his people through economic reform, the more vulnerable his
political survival will be.
Concluding Remarks
North Korea’s succession has hardly attracted proper attention as a variable
inﬂuencing North Korea’s foreign policy behavior. Political obsessions generated as
a result of domestic political burdens are usually overlooked in an analysis of for-
eign policy. However, calculations about domestic political costs are sometimes indi-
cated to outweigh apparently visible costs such as body counts, ﬁnancial damage, and
loss of military resources.47
As long as Kim  Jong- un places his political survival as the highest priority, mas-
sive economic reform that would relieve economic destitution will not be an attrac-
tive option. The reform would be accompanied by “unhealthy” capitalist elements
that might jeopardize his political survival. In this regard, inclusion of the succes-
sion as one of the variables would add another perspective in the analysis of North
Korea’s foreign policy.
This implies that North Korean policy should be directed to the factors regard-
ing the political survival of the founder of North Korea, Kim  Il- sung, and his fam-
ily, not to factors regarding North Korea as a state. This is why huge economic
packages have failed to elicit North Korea’s enthusiastic cooperation toward  tension-
 reducing policy. Likewise, sanctions by the UN will not generate effective results
unless they are targeted at the political survival of the founder of North Korea, Kim
 Il- sung, and his family.
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